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Do people lose hope when thinking about death? Based on Terror Management Theory, we predicted
that thoughts of death (i.e., mortality salience) would reduce personal hope for people low, but not
high, in self-esteem, and that this reduction in hope would be ameliorated by promises of immortality.
In Studies 1 and 2, mortality salience reduced personal hope for people low in self-esteem, but not for
people high in self-esteem. In Study 3, mortality salience reduced hope for people low in self-esteem
when they read an argument that there is no afterlife, but not when they read “evidence” supporting
life after death. In Study 4, this effect was replicated with an essay affirming scientific medical
advances that promise immortality. Together, these findings uniquely demonstrate that thoughts of
mortality interact with trait self-esteem to cause changes in personal hope, and that literal immortality
beliefs can aid psychological adjustment when thinking about death. Implications for understanding
personal hope, trait self-esteem, afterlife beliefs and terror management are discussed.
Keywords: Hope; Death; Self-esteem; Afterlife beliefs; Religion; Mortality salience.
To live without hope is to cease to live. (Fyodor
Dostoevsky)
While there’s life, there’s hope. (Cicero)
Self-awareness creates the potential for hope:
the general expectation and feeling that future
desired outcomes will occur. However, self-aware-
ness also renders humans conscious of their own
mortality (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,
1986). This awareness of mortality, that life is
ultimately destined to end in biological decay and
oblivion, offers a potentially potent and direct
challenge to thoughts and feelings of hope.
Indeed, hopelessness is associated with higher
levels of death-related thought and suicidal idea-
tion (Chochinov, Wilson, Enns, & Lander, 1998).
In light of this, and a broad body of research
demonstrating that hope is associated with greater
psychological well-being, physical health, mental
functioning and self-regulation (see Snyder, 2002,
for review), research testing the role of mortality
thoughts (mortality salience) on hope is an
important research topic. To date, however, no
research has explored the causal impact of mortal-
ity salience on perceptions of personal hope, or the
potential factors that moderate this relationship.
Drawing on Terror Management Theory (TMT;
Greenberg et al., 1986), we hypothesised that
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mortality salience reduces hope for people low, but
not high, in trait self-esteem. In addition, we
predicted that cultural worldviews promoting lit-
eral immortality (either religious or scientific)
ameliorate this reduction in hope.
TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY
TMT (Greenberg et al., 1986) posits that self-
esteem and cultural worldviews help people cope
with a very basic, and potentially terrifying,
psychological conflict. On the one hand, humans,
like all animals, have a biological inclination
towards survival; humans, however, developed a
unique sense of symbolic self-awareness that
renders them awareness that life is finite (Leary
& Buttermore, 2003; Sedikides, Skowronski, &
Dunbar, 2006; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszc-
zynski, 2004). In response, a uniquely human
symbolic solution arose: culture. By contributing
to cultural worldviews that continue beyond one’s
own death, humans gain a sense of symbolic
immortality (e.g., contributing to something that
outlives the self) or literal immortality (e.g.,
afterlife belief) that aids in coping with the
awareness of their own death. Further, according
to TMT, self-esteem developed as a gauge by
which people perceive that they are (or are not)
living up to the values and standards of their
cultural worldviews.
Hundreds of studies (see Burke, Martens, &
Faucher, 2010) support the two primary TMT
hypotheses. The mortality salience hypothesis posits
that if self-esteem and cultural worldviews protect
against the awareness (and threat) of personal
mortality, then people should defend these struc-
tures more when reminded of mortality. Specific-
ally, mortality salience has been shown to increase:
support for people who share one’s religious beliefs
(Greenberg et al., 1990), violence against those
who hold different worldviews (McGregor et al.,
1998), in-group humanisation (Vaes, Heflick, &
Goldenberg, 2010) and agreement with positive
personality feedback (Dechesne et al., 2003).
TMT also posits the anxiety buffer hypothesis,
stating that affirmation of “cultural anxiety
buffers” (e.g., self-esteem and cultural worldviews)
prior to reminders of mortality should reduce
subsequent defensive responses (e.g., self-enhance-
ment and worldview defence). Consistent with
this hypothesis, both self-esteem boosts and
worldview affirmations reduce defensive responses
after reminders of mortality (Arndt & Greenberg,
1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Schmeichel &
Martens, 2005) and reduce death thought access-
ibility (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). More recent
TMT work extends these findings by showing that
trait self-esteem is associated with improved psy-
chological adjustment (e.g., feelings of vitality, less
anxiety; Abeyta, Juhl, & Routledge, 2014; Routle-
dge et al., 2010) when pondering death. Outside of
TMT, there is also ample evidence that affirming
the value of the self and strengthening group
identity increases psychological resilience (Cohen
& Sherman, 2014; Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, &
Alexander, 2012). Together this research suggests
that the cultural anxiety buffer functions as a kind
of “psychological immune system” (Gilbert, Pinel,
Wilson, Blumberg, &Wheatley, 1998; Wisman &
Goldenberg, 2005) that protects people when
thinking about death (Wisman, 2006), and even
reduces death-related cognition (Arndt, Green-
berg, Solomon, et al., 1997; Pyszczynski, Green-
berg, & Solomon, 2000). Thus, importantly, TMT
provides an explanation for why most people do not
go through life psychologically paralysed with
terror and death anxiety.
In a meta-analysis of over 175 studies (Burke
et al., 2010), thoughts of death were compared to
a wide range of comparison topics, some which
were aversive (e.g., thoughts of pain, failure and
social exclusion) and some of which were more
neutral (television and no comparison topic). The
results indicated that mortality salience reliably
impacted self-esteem striving and worldview
defence, regardless of the nature of the comparison
condition (e.g., aversive or neutral). This suggests
that the findings are unique to (and driven by)
thoughts of death. Further, mortality salience
effects have been found across a wide range of
mortality salience primes (e.g., subliminal priming,
written responses to two open-ended statements,
proximity to a graveyard, temporality from a
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natural disaster and answers to multiple choice
true–false questions; Arndt, Greenberg, Pysz-
cynski, & Solomon, 1997; Greenberg et al.,
1990; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Pyszczynski et al.,
1996) and cross-culturally (e.g., Heine, Harihara,
& Niiya, 2002; Routledge et al., 2010).
HOPE AND TERROR
MANAGEMENT
Many empirical and theoretical “positive psycho-
logy” oriented approaches have aimed at under-
standing hope (Lopez, Snyder, & Pedrotti,
2003). One popular perspective (Snyder, 2002)
has proposed that hope is the sum of two
cognitive beliefs: pathways thinking (the per-
ceived ability to self-generate routes to desired
outcomes) and agency thinking (the perceived
capacity for the self to maintain and initiate
action towards desired outcomes). Research,
however, indicates that laypeople’s perceptions of
hope are associated with agency, but not path-
ways, thinking (Tong, Fredrickson, Chang, &
Lim, 2010), and that hope is cognitive, and
affectively pleasant (Bruininks & Malle, 2005;
Staats & Stassen, 1985; Tong, 2014). In turn, we
define hope as the general expectation and feeling
that future desired outcomes will occur (largely
independently of cognitions about how these
outcomes will occur).1
From an existential perspective, personal hope
should be effective in helping people cope with
mortality thoughts. With hope, there is a sense
that one’s life will be positive in the future,
regardless of one’s current or past situation,
making coping with any experience, including
burdensome thoughts of death, manageable and
worthwhile. Indeed, there is evidence that people
are motivated to find, and maintain, hope when
thinking about death. For instance, when people
are confronted with serious health threats (e.g.,
lung cancer), they increase efforts to create hope
(Salander, Bergknut, & Henriksson, 2014; Borne-
man, Irish, Sidhu, Koczywas, & Cristea, 2014),
and women with “adaptive” coping styles follow-
ing a breast cancer diagnosis also maintain high
levels of hope (Stanton, Danoff-Burg, & Huggins,
2002). Additionally, Rutjens, van der Pligt, and
van Harreveld (2009) found in several experiments
that people agree less with essays describing
humanity as not progressing after a mortality
salience manipulation (progress being related to
hope). These and other findings, indicating that
hope is broadly and consistently associated with
greater psychological well-being and self-regula-
tion (see Snyder, 2002, for review), and that a lack
of hope is associated with serious psychological
maladjustment (e.g., Thimm, Holte, Brennem, &
Wang 2013; Tucker et al., 2013), support our
premise that hope plays an important role in
helping to regulate existential concerns.
Hope, however, is directly challenged by the
prospect of death. Death is a reminder that one’s
life will end in biological decay—and also repre-
sents the stopping point for, and ultimate oblit-
eration of, all desired outcomes. Consistent with
this, there is also ample evidence that some people
experience reduced hope, and even lose hope
altogether, when dealing with terminal illnesses
(Herth, 1990), or the death of a loved one
(Michael & Snyder, 2005). Trait level thoughts
of death (and suicidal ideation) are also associated
with lower levels of hope (Chochinov et al., 1998).
Ironically, people who lose hope when facing
reminders of personal mortality may even be at
greater risk of death (Baumeister, 1990). But, who




Recall that TMT proposes that self-esteem pro-
tects people from mortality concerns as it serves as
1 There is ample evidence that hope is related to, but distinct from, optimism (e.g., hope is more affective and more
future oriented than optimism; Bruininks & Malle, 2005) and from self-efficacy and self-esteem (hope persists even when
people perceive no control over desired outcomes; Aspinwall & Leaf, 2002; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
HOPE AND DEATH

























a gauge of a person leading a meaningful, valued
life in the context of one’s cultural worldview. At
least three lines of research support this notion.
First, thoughts of death heighten the pursuit of
self-esteem (e.g., increase agreement with positive
personality feedback; Dechesne et al., 2003, and
credit taking following successes; Mikulincer &
Florian, 2002). Second, thoughts of death are
directly associated with self-esteem; challenging
people’s sense of self-worth heightens death
thought accessibility (Hayes, Schimel, & Wil-
liams, 2008), and high trait self-esteem is asso-
ciated with less death thought accessibility
(Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Perhaps the stron-
gest evidence for the role of trait self-esteem in
effectively coping with thoughts of one’s own
mortality, however, is evidence that it moderates
psychological adjustment when thinking about
one’s own mortality (Routledge et al., 2010). For
people low, but not high, in trait self-esteem,
mortality salience reduces life satisfaction and
feelings of vitality, while it increases overall
negative affect and, in particular, anxiety (Abeyta
et al., 2014; Routledge et al., 2010). In addition,
high trait level thoughts of death are associated
with poorer psychological well-being, but only for
people low in trait self-esteem (Routledge et al.,
2010). Low, but not high, trait self-esteem is also
associated with more negative self-awareness, and
unhealthy behaviours aimed at reducing negative
self-awareness (such as consuming large quantities
of alcohol; Wisman, Heflick, & Goldenberg,
2014), when people are reminded of death.
Finally, people at the end of life also have less
anxiety when they have high levels of trait self-
esteem (Neel, Lo, Rydall, Hales, & Rodin, 2013).
Thus, trait self-esteem is associated with greater
psychological well-being when thinking about
death. It follows that people with low self-esteem
have greater difficulties dealing with existential
concerns than people high in self-esteem (Routle-
dge et al., 2010; Wisman, 2006). As such, our first
hypothesis is that mortality salience lowers per-




It has been theorised that cultural worldviews
promising an afterlife emerged in tandem with
the symbolic self (e.g., self-awareness), and that
these beliefs have existed since the earliest forms of
human cultural existence (Sedikides et al., 2006;
Winzeler, 2008). Afterlife belief directly helps to
solve the problem of death awareness (e.g., “I
will die—but I will not really die because I will
live on”); indeed, it is arguably the most direct
way to cope with mortality concerns (Vail et al.,
2010). Supporting this, correlational research
indicates that spiritual beliefs (i.e., belief in God
and life after death) are associated with less death
anxiety (e.g., Harding, Flannelly, Weaver, &
Costa, 2005) and less end of life despair
(McClain-Jacobson et al., 2004). Death row
inmates also frequently mention afterlife belief in
the statements they make directly before being
executed (Cooney & Phillips, 2013; Heflick,
2005). Further, in experiments, when people
read mock scientific evidence of an afterlife (but
not when provided with the alternative certainty
that life merely ends), they subsequently display
less worldview defence and self-enhancement
(Dechesne et al., 2003). This is true for atheists,
theists and agnostics (Heflick & Goldenberg,
2012). There is also evidence that immortality
beliefs impact feelings of hope. The effect of
religious beliefs on physical and mental health
(e.g., Koole, McCullough, Kuhl, & Roelofsma,
2010) is mediated by hope (e.g., for women with
breast cancer; Hasson-Ohayon, Braun, Galinsky,
& Baider, 2009). Moreover, religious beliefs have
been found to comfort hospice patients by offer-
ing a sense of hope via life after death (Pevey,
Jones, & Yarber, 2008).
In sum, there is solid evidence that mortality
concerns are assuaged by promises of literal
immortality (belief that the self will continue to
live) via belief in an afterlife. From a TMT
perspective, this should also occur when literal
immortality is promised in alternative ways (e.g.,
medical advances), though research as far as we
WISMAN AND HEFLICK

























know has not tested this. As such, our second
hypothesis states that the promise of literal
immortality ameliorates the effect of mortality
salience on reduced hope for people low in self-
esteem (high self-esteem individuals are hypothe-
sised to not have reduced hope after mortality
salience regardless of the immortality prime). That
is, people with low self-esteem will experience
reduced hope when thinking about death, but this
will not occur when they read promises of literal
immortality.
OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
We conducted four studies to examine the hypo-
thesis that reminders of mortality reduce personal
hope for people low in self-esteem, but not people
high in self-esteem. In addition, we tested our
hypothesis that offering “evidence” promising
immortality, whether via life after death or medical
advances, can help to neutralise the decreased
personal hope that we expect to find among
people low in self-esteem after reminders of
mortality. This is because although death threa-
tens the expectation of positive future outcomes,
immortality beliefs can help to restore these
expectations of a positive future by providing
people with a sense of literal immortality. How-
ever, to date, no studies have experimentally tested
if mortality thoughts cause changes in personal
hope (or if this is moderated by trait self-esteem),
or if promises of literal immortality buffer the
influence of mortality salience on psychological
well-being.
Studies 1–2 examined the effect of mortality
salience on personal hope directly by measuring
trait self-esteem, and then having participants
write about their own death or an aversive control
topic (i.e., their own physical pain). Hope was
then measured using a variety of measures (Staats,
1989; Snyder et al., 1996) that collectively assessed
the cognitive and affective components of both
short- and long-term hope. In Study 3, we re‐
peated this design but additionally had partici-
pants read either an essay arguing that there is
scientific “evidence” of life after death or an essay
arguing that there is no evidence for life after
death. In Study 4, we tested these ideas by
replacing an afterlife affirmation with an essay
ostensibly describing medical advances that could
promise immortality. All methods, materials and
analyses conducted across all four studies are
reported in accordance to journal policy.2
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we sought to test the hypothesis that
mortality salience (reminders of personal mortal-
ity) reduces feelings of personal hope, but only for
people low in self-esteem. To do so, we utilised
Staats Hope Index (1989), a measure that taps
both cognitive and affective components of hope
by assessing fit between desires and expectations of
their future. The greater the fit between people’s
desires and expectations about the future, the more
hope they have. Merely desiring positive outcomes
does not reflect the construct of hope very well
(Staats, 1989). For instance, people would not be
extremely hopeful if they wished for less rain while
living in a high precipitation area, if they do not
also expect less rain (and not expecting
highly desired outcomes to occur is associated, if
anything, with poor mental health; see e.g.,
Baumeister, 1990). We predicted that people low
in self-esteem would uniquely experience lowered
feelings of personal hope after thinking about their
own mortality. This is consistent with abundant
research showing that self-esteem functions as an
anxiety buffer against the negative cognitive and
affective consequences of death awareness (Arndt
& Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997;
Routledge et al., 2010).
2 For all reported studies, we report all data exclusions and all included measurements in text, in accordance with journal
policy. Sample size was determined using an end of semester stopping point (Studies 1 and 3) or using a planned sample size
(Studies 2 and 4) that would provide at least 80% power based on the average effect size of .35 (found across hundreds of
studies priming mortality; see Burke et al., 2010, but see Yen & Cheng, 2013, for slightly smaller estimates). At no point
were additional data collected after data were initially analysed.
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Seventy undergraduate students (53 women and
17 men, Mage = 21.60, SD = 5.54) from the
University of Kent participated for course credit in
a study ostensibly concerned with personality
characteristics.
Procedure and materials
Participants completed materials in a laboratory on
a standard PC equipped with Authorware 7.1
software. After completing several personality
questionnaires to convey the cover story, partici-
pants were presented with the Rosenberg’s Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), which measures
global feelings about the self with 10 items such
as, “I take a positive attitude toward myself” and “I
certainly feel useless at times” (reversed).
Responses were assessed using a 5-point agree-
ment format, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 =
strongly agree. In a review of major measures of
self-esteem (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991), Rosen-
berg’s Self-Esteem Scale was found to have
sufficient psychometric properties, such as internal
consistency, test–retest reliability, and convergent
and discriminant validity. Consistent with this, in
our study, we found the scale to have good internal
reliability (α = .85; M = 3.68, SD = 0.71).
Following the assessment of self-esteem, parti-
cipants were then randomly assigned to a mortality
salience or an aversive control condition (e.g.,
Greenberg et al., 1990). In the mortality salience
condition, participants responded to two open-
ended questions: “Briefly describe the emotions
that the thought of your own death arouses in you”
and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you
think will happen to you physically as you die and
once you are physically dead”. The aversive control
condition consisted of two parallel items regarding
the experience of physical pain (e.g., “Briefly
describe the emotions that the thought of your
own physical pain arouses in you”). A few studies
have found that pain salience has effects that more
closely approximate mortality salience effects
(though mortality salience has stronger effects;
Holbrook, Sousa, & Hahn-Holbrook, 2011).
Thus, using pain salience provided, if anything, a
more rigid test of our hypothesis than using more
neutral control conditions.
The effects of mortality salience (on worldview
defence, self-esteem striving and affective states)
occur after a delay when thoughts of death are
active, but no longer conscious (i.e., when they
have receded from consciousness after being made
conscious; see Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al.,
1997). In turn, after the mortality salience manip-
ulation, participants completed the 20-item Pos-
itive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to provide the
necessary delay. Specifically, participants indicated
the extent to which each of 10 positive affect items
(e.g., attentive: α = .88; M = 3.10, SD = 0.71) and
10 negative affect items (e.g., angry: α = .86; M =
1.70, SD = 0.64) reflected how they felt right at
that moment (1 = very slightly or not at all and 5 =
extremely). Including the PANAS also enabled us
to control for any potential influences of positive
and negative affect after the mortality salience
prime; however, based on hundreds of studies
(e.g., Routledge et al., 2010), we did not expect
this to occur, nor did we expect any change in
affect immediately following mortality salience
(Routledge et al., 2010).3 After the mood meas-
urement, to further enable thoughts of death to
recede from consciousness (Arndt, Greenberg,
Solomon, et al., 1997), participants also completed
a “dot” to “dot” task in which they drew lines to
connect numbered dots in order to create a tree
image.
Finally, for the dependent variable, participants
completed the personal hope subscale of the Staats
3 In Study 2, we found a marginally significant mortality salience by self-esteem interaction on positive affect, B = .02,
SE = .01, t = 1.91, p = .060. However, importantly, covarying positive affect and negative affect did not significantly impact
any of the significant interaction effects across all four studies. There was a main effect of self-esteem on positive affect
(related to higher levels) and negative affect (related to lower levels), but no interaction effect or mortality salience main effect
emerged on either positive or negative affect in Studies 1, 3 and 4.
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Hope Index (Staats, 1989), which assesses both
affective and cognitive components of hope. Spe-
cifically, each of the eight items consisted of two
sub-items that measured to what extent partici-
pants wished (1 = not at all and 5 = very much) a
certain outcome (e.g., “To be happy”) and to what
extent they expected this to happen (1 = not at all
and 5 = very much). To create an overall score of
personal hope, we subtracted both scores on each
single item (“expect” minus the “wish scores”) and
summed up the subtracted score (such that lower
scores reflect lower levels of hope) into an average
personal hope index (α = .74; M = −0.66, SD =
0.49) that formed our dependent variable (Staats
& Stassen, 1985). A higher match between wishes
and expectations (the more positive the resulting
value) indicates higher levels of hope.
Results
To test the hypothesis that death thoughts reduce
personal hope for individuals with low, but not
high, self-esteem, we carried out a regression
analysis with the main effects for the experimental
manipulation (dummy coded) and self-esteem
(mean centred) entered at Step 1, and their
interaction entered at Step 2 (Aiken & West,
1991). There was a main effect of self-esteem,
indicating that high self-esteem was associated
with more hope, B = .03, SE = .08, t(67) = 4.83,
p < .001, adjusted R2 = .17. The main effect for
the mortality salience manipulation was not signi-
ficant (p = .12). However, as hypothesised, there
was a significant interaction at Step 2 between
self-esteem and mortality salience, B = −.04, SE =
.02, t(66) = −2.52, p = .014, adjusted R2 = .23.
We then conducted predicted mean compar-
isons at one standard deviation above and below
the standardised self-esteem mean. Consistent
with our hypothesis, mortality salience, relative to
the control condition, decreased hope at low levels
of self-esteem (−1 SD), B = −3.90, SE = 1.34,
t(66) = −2.91, p = .005, but not at high levels of
self-esteem (1 SD), B = 1.08, SE = 1.41, t(66) =
0.45, p > .44. Moreover, low levels of self-esteem
predicted decreased hope as compared with high
levels of self-esteem in the mortality salience
condition, B = −.42, SE = .09, t(66) = −4.83,
p < .001, but not in the control condition, B =
−0.07, SE = 0.11, t(66) = −0.61, p = .54 (see
Figure 1).
Discussion
The findings of Study 1 provided support for our
hypothesis: reminders of mortality (compared to
pain salience) decreased personal hope, but only
for participants with low self-esteem. This was
found when measuring hope as the (cognitive and
affective) fit between expectations and desires
about the future. Further, the effects also occurred
within the mortality salience condition, but not
within the pain condition. This is consistent with
the notion that mortality thoughts are reducing
hope for people with low self-esteem (in contrast
to pain salience driving the effect). One limitation
of this study, however, is the relatively small
sample size.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we sought to replicate the findings of
Study 1 with different measures of hope and a
larger sample. One measure assesses cognitive
hope in terms of immediate goals (i.e., “Adult
State Hope Scale”; Snyder et al., 1996). This scale




















Figure 1. General personal hope as a function of mortality
salience and trait self-esteem (Study 1). Note: Lower numbers
denote less hope.
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agency thinking. “Pathways thinking” refers to the
belief that one can effectively plan for/conceptua-
lise paths towards goals, whereas “agency think-
ing” refers to the belief that one can maintain
action to achieve goals (i.e., desired outcomes).
The other hope measure we created specifically to
assess people’s current, general, feelings and
expectations about the future (what we call “state
future hope”). Thus, these two scales enabled us to
distinctly test people’s current hope, related to
either the immediate future or the more distant
future. As “pathways thinking”—or beliefs about
how desired outcomes will be met—is not related
to people’s perceptions of hope (Tong et al.,
2010), we made no hypothesis regarding this
variable. But, we expected the “agency thinking”
aspect of the Adult State Hope Scale, as well as
scores on the state future hope scale we created, to
be lowered for people with low self-esteem (but
not high self-esteem) when thinking about death.
One final addition to Study 2 was that we tested
our hypotheses using an American Internet sample
(which tend to be older on average than student
samples) instead of a British student sample and
recruited a higher number of participants.
Method
Participants
Participants were 100 American users of Amazon
MTurk (60 women and 40 men; Mage = 35.3, SD
= 13.1) who received $0.35 for participating in a
study ostensibly concerned with personality.
Procedure and materials
Prior to the measures of hope, the design for
Study 2 was identical to the design in Study 1,
with one exception. Instead of the dot to dot task
following the PANAS, participants read a short
story by Albert Camus that functioned as a delay
(e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon,
& Breus, 1994) and was easier to administer
through MTurk. As in Study 1, the Rosenberg’s
Self-Esteem Scale (M = 3.81, SD = 0.71) was
found to have sufficient reliability (α = .90) as was
the Negative Affect Schedule (α = .90; M = 1.52,
SD = 0.68 and the Positive Affect Schedule (α =
.91, M = 2.73, SD = 0.91) of the PANAS.
For the dependent variable, participants com-
pleted the Adult State Hope Scale (Snyder et al.,
1996) that consists of six items. Three items are
theorised to measure participant’s cognitive sense
of agency to achieve current personal goals (1 =
Definitely false and 5 = Definitely true; e.g., “At this
present time, I am energetically pursuing my
goals”; α = .71, M = 3.60, SD = 0.73) and three
items to measure participants cognitive sense of
pathways to achieve current personal goals (e.g.,
“There are lots of ways around any jam that I am
in now”; α = .82, M = 3.50, SD = 0.70). This was
followed by a state personal future hope scale
consisting of 5 items (α = .90; M = 3.51, SD =
0.86), which we designed to measure “state future
hope”—state perceptions and feelings of hope in
terms of future goals (“Right now, my future looks
bright”, “Right now, I am hopeful about most
aspects of my life”, “Right now, I believe my
dreams come true” and “Right now, when I think
about my future I feel happy”). Responses were
assessed using a 5-point agreement format, where
1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. Finally,
we gauged participants afterlife beliefs (“I believe
in life after death”; 1 = strongly disagree, and 9 =
strongly agree), followed by standard demographic
items.
Results
First, we examined if reminders of death predict
less state hope (in terms of immediate goals) for
people low, but not high, in self-esteem in terms
of “agency thinking”. The main effect of mortality
salience was not significant (p = .31), but the main
effect of self-esteem was significant, indicating
that low self-esteem was associated with lower
levels of agency thinking, B = .12, SE = .03, t(97)
= 4.23, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .15. Additionally,
as hypothesised, this effect was qualified by a
significant interaction in the second step, B =
−.16, SE = .06, t(96) = −2.61, p = .011, adjusted
R2 = .20. To probe this interaction further, we
conducted predicted mean comparisons at one
standard deviation above and below the
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standardised self-esteem mean. As in Study 1,
mortality salience, relative to the control condi-
tion, decreased agency thinking at low levels of
self-esteem (−1 SD), B = 1.90, SE = .70, t(96) =
2.70, p = .01, but not at high levels of self-esteem
(1 SD), B = −.82, SE = .66, t(96) = −1.25, p >
.22. Furthermore, low levels of self-esteem pre-
dicted decreased agency thinking relative to high
levels of self-esteem in the mortality salience
condition, B = .15, SE = .030, t(96) = 5.07, p <
.001, but not in the control condition, B = −.012,
SE = .055, t(96) = −.21, p = .83 (see Figure 2).
We repeated this regression analysis switching
“agency thinking” for “pathways thinking” as the
dependent variable. There was a main effect of
self-esteem, indicating that low self-esteem was
associated with lower levels of state pathways
thinking, B = .046, SE = .007, t(97) = 6.67, p <
.001. Furthermore, a marginal main effect of
mortality salience emerged, indicating that
thoughts of death were associated with lower
levels of state pathways thinking, B = .23, SE =
.11, t(97) = 1.99, p = .050, adjusted R2 = .33. This
effect of mortality salience was not qualified by a
significant interaction in the second step, B =
−.01, SE = .02, t(96) = −.77, p = .44. Thus, as
anticipated, mortality salience did not interact
with self-esteem to influence pathways thinking.
Rather, mortality salience reduced current pathway
thinking for both people low and high in self-
esteem.
To test the proposed self-esteem by death
thoughts interaction using a measure of “state
future hope”, we carried out another regression
analysis. As with agency hope, there was a main
effect of self-esteem, indicating that high self-
esteem was associated with higher levels of state
future hope, B = .07, SE = .01, t(97) = 9.85, p <
.001, and a main effect of mortality salience
approaching significance, B = .20, SE = 12, t(97)
= 1.69, p = .09, adjusted R2 = .51. However, again,
these effects were qualified by a significant inter-
action in the second step, B = −.04, SE = .02,
t(96) = −2.47, p = .015, adjusted R2 = .53. To
probe this interaction, we again conducted pre-
dicted mean comparisons at ±1 SD from the
mean. Low levels of self-esteem (−1 SD) predicted
less state future hope as compared with high levels
of self-esteem (1 SD) in the mortality salience
condition, B = .82, SE = .08, t(96) = 10.06, p <
.001, and in the control condition, B = −.040, SE
= .02, t(96) = 2.57, p = .009. However, mortality
salience, compared to the control condition,
decreased general hope at low levels of self-esteem,
B = .57, SE = .19, t(96) = 3.01, p = .003, but not at
high levels of self-esteem, B = −.13, SE = .18,




















Figure 2. Agency hope for immediate goals as a function of
mortality salience and trait self-esteem (Study 2). Note: Lower























Figure 3. State future hope as a function of mortality salience
and trait self-esteem (Study 2). Note: Lower numbers denote
less hope.
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Finally, we tested if belief in an afterlife is
correlated with our measurements of hope. We
found a positive correlation between belief in an
afterlife and the agency hope scale (r(100) = .29,
p < .001), the state personal future hope scale (r =
.29; p < .005) and the state pathways hope scale
(r = .31; p < .005).
Discussion
Using a more highly powered sample, Study 2
indicated that people low, but not high, in self-
esteem experienced reduced feelings of personal
hope for the distant future (“state future hope”)
when thinking about death relative to the control
(pain) condition. This same effect was found when
personal hope was assessed for agency thinking
towards immediate (future) goals. As in Study 1,
these results also occurred within the mortality
salience condition, but not the pain condition. In
conjunction with Study 1, the results of Study 2
indicate that mortality salience weakens hope for
individuals with low self-esteem, both for cognit-
ive and affective components, and for more
immediate and more future-oriented desired out-
comes. That the results were found using two
distinct samples (American MTurk users and
British college students) that consisted of different
age ranges and gender compositions provides
further support for the generalisability of mortality
salience in lowering personal hope for people low
in self-esteem. Additionally, there was a correla-
tion between afterlife belief and hope. This raises
the possibility that literal immortality could aid
people (low in self-esteem) in preserving their
feelings of hope when reminded of death.
Also, consistent with evidence that “pathways
thinking” is not associated with laypeople’s reports
of hope (Tong et al., 2010), we found a main
effect for mortality salience in lowering “pathways
thinking” (as opposed to the interaction found
with other measures of hope). Although we made
no hypothesis regarding this variable, this effect
makes sense in that there is no way to avoid death
(e.g., “to get out a jam” as stated in the pathways
scale). As such, when completing this scale, all
participants (regardless of self-esteem) in the death
thought condition may have been acutely aware
that there are no real “pathways” available that can
avoid the most salient problem: death (i.e., it is an
inevitable “jam” that cannot be escaped). In
contrast, the ability to maintain the belief that
you can pursue your immediate goals (state
“agency thinking”) is not as directly challenged
by the problem of death, nor is the belief that your
future-oriented desires and expectations will come
true (state future hope), enabling people with high
self-esteem to maintain hope on those variables.
STUDY 3
Is there a way to preserve hope for people with low
self-esteem when thinking about death? Mortality
is a potential threat to hope, as it signals an end to
all potential positive future outcomes. Ample
research suggests that afterlife beliefs reduce psy-
chological defensiveness when thinking about
death (e.g., Dechesne et al., 2003). This makes
sense, because with the belief in an afterlife the
problem of mortality is averted. Moreover, the
promise that life will continue, in one way or
the other, seems for most people a more hopeful
prospect than the process of organic decay (Solo-
mon et al., 2004). As such, although no research
we know of has explored the interaction between
afterlife belief and mortality thoughts on psycho-
logical well-being, these beliefs should protect
psychological well-being (preserve hope) for peo-
ple with low self-esteem when they are thinking
about death.
In Study 3, we sought to replicate the effects of
Studies 1 and 2 showing that mortality salience
reduces hope for people low, but not high, in self-
esteem. Further, we wanted to test our second
hypothesis, stating that this effect for people low
in trait self-esteem will not occur if they are
provided with promises of literal immortality. For
people with high self-esteem, we did not predict
that literal immortality promises would boost (or
reduce) hope when death was salient, as they do
not experience reduced or increased hope when
thinking about death. This is consistent with
TMT in that high trait self-esteem is reducing
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all impact of death thoughts, possibly rendering
the promises of literal immortality less influential.
Method
Participants
Eighty undergraduate students from the Univer-
sity of Kent in the UK (29 women and 51 men,
Mage = 20.33; SD = 3.15) participated for course
credit.
Procedure and materials
The materials and procedure were identical to
Studies 1 and 2 through the PANAS mood scale.
The Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale was again
found to be a reliable scale (α = .93; M = 3.46,
SD = 0.98), as was the PANAS mood scale for
both positive affect (α = .84; M = 3.03, SD = 0.72)
and negative affect (α = .86; M = 2.07, SD = 0.88).
In this study, however, the PANAS was followed
by a word search puzzle to increase delay to allow
thoughts of death to recede from consciousness
(Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997). This
was followed by our manipulation of afterlife belief,
which was adapted from Dechesne et al. (2003).
Participants in the afterlife affirmation condi-
tion read:
People who have near death experiences (NDEs)
often report detailed descriptions of an afterlife.
Recent research (Barkowski, 2005) revealed that
these NDEs cannot be accounted for by chemical
changes in the brain that occur during the process
of dying. Moreover, it was found that NDEs
show a remarkable congruity across different
cultures. The latter suggests that NDEs are a
product of the reality rather than a product of
imagination. Overall, these findings suggest that
there is support for the existence of life after
death.
Participants in the afterlife disconfirmation
condition read:
People who have near death experiences (NDEs)
often report detailed descriptions of an afterlife.
Recent research (Barkowski, 2005) revealed that
these NDEs can be accounted for by chemical
changes in the brain that occur during the process
of dying. Moreover, it was found that NDEs
show a remarkable incongruity across different
cultures. The latter suggests that NDEs are a
product of the brain rather than a product of
reality. Overall, these findings suggest that there
is no support for the existence of life after death.
The afterlife manipulation was followed by two
questions aimed at evaluating the presented NDE
research. Specifically, we gauged participants
agreement (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly
agree) with two items that rated the reliability and
importance of the presented NDE research (e.g.,
“Research into near death experiences is very
important” and “The research above sounds reli-
able to me”). These items were averaged to form
the NDE research evaluation scale (α = .90; M =
3.03; SD = 0.74). This served to verify that
participants did not differ in their general attitudes
towards the two essays across conditions. Finally,
as in Study 1, participants completed the Staats
Hope Index (Staats, 1989) to measure participants’
levels of hope (α = .71; M = −.78, SD = 0.68),
followed by standard demographic items.
Results
First, we subjected our NDE research manipula-
tion check to a two-group (afterlife argument:
affirmation and disconfirmation) between-subjects
analysis of variance (ANOVA). No significant
main effect was found (p = .19). Participants in
the afterlife disconfirmation condition (M = 2.91,
SD = 1.05) evaluated the mock “scientific” evid-
ence as equally important and valid as participants
in the afterlife confirmation condition (M = 2.59,
SD = 1.06). Thus, both the afterlife affirmation
and afterlife disconfirming research were evaluated
as equally important and valid. This suggests that
our manipulations were successful in conveying
the mock scientific evidence.
To test the hypothesis that participants with
low self-esteem have lower levels of personal hope
when thoughts of death are salient, but not when
provided with evidence of life after death, we
conducted a regression analysis with the main
effects for the mortality salience manipulation
(dummy coded), afterlife manipulation (dummy
coded) and self-esteem (mean centred) entered at
Step 1. At Step 2, we entered all possible two-way
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interaction terms between the afterlife manipula-
tion, mortality salience manipulation and self-
esteem, and at Step 3, we entered the three-way
interaction between those variables. In the first
step, we again found a significant main effect of
self-esteem, B = .02, SE = .01, t(76) = 2.54, p =
.013, adjusted R2 = .06, showing that low self-
esteem was associated with decreased levels of
personal hope, but mortality salience and the
afterlife manipulation were not significant factors
(ps > .18). At Step 2, only the mortality salience
by self-esteem interaction approached significance,
B = −.03, SE = .01, t(73) = −1.85, p = .068,
adjusted R2 = .07 (all other interaction effects,
ps > .5). In the third step, as hypothesised, we
found a significant three-way interaction between
mortality salience, the afterlife manipulation and
self-esteem, B = −.06, SE = .03, t(72) = −2.09, p =
.041, adjusted R2 = .11.
Given the significant three-way interaction, we
then analysed the effects within the afterlife
affirmation essay and within the afterlife discon-
firming essay separately using the same regression
approach (but excluding Step 3). At Step 1, we
found a non-significant main effect of self-esteem,
B = .02, SE = .01, t(36) = 1.78, p = .084, adjusted
R2 = .04. No main mortality salience effects were
found (p = .53). However, within the afterlife
disconfirmation condition, there was a significant
self-esteem by mortality salience interaction at
Step 2, B = −.07, SE = .02, t(35) = −2.75, p =
.009, adjusted R2 = .18. Predicted mean compar-
isons at ±1 SD from the standardised self-esteem
mean indicated that mortality salience, relative to
the control condition, decreased personal hope at
low levels of self-esteem (−1 SD), B = .82, SE =
.32, t(35) = 2.53, p = .016, but not at high levels of
self-esteem (+1 SD), B = −.50, SE = .32, t(35) =
−1.58, p = .12. Furthermore, low levels of self-
esteem predicted decreased hope as compared with
high levels of self-esteem in the mortality salience
condition, B = 0.061, SE = 0.018, t(35) = 3.34, p =
.002, but not in the control condition, B = −.006,
SE = .016, t(35) = −0.38, p = .71 (see Figure 4).
We proceeded by looking at the effects within
the afterlife affirmation manipulation only. We
carried out the same regression analysis as when
testing within the afterlife disconfirming condition
effects. This analysis revealed a marginally signi-
ficant main effect of self-esteem, B = .02, SE =
.01, t(38) = 1.82, p = .076, adjusted R2 = .07. No
main effect of mortality salience was found (p =
.19). Importantly, the results did not yield a
mortality salience by self-esteem interaction (p =
.88). Thus, in contrast to within the afterlife
disconfirmation condition, and consistent with
our hypothesis, mortality salience did not decrease
personal hope for participant low in self-esteem,





















Figure 4. General personal hope as a function of a mortality
salience and trait self-esteem in the afterlife disconfirmation




















Figure 5. General personal hope as a function of a mortality
salience and trait self-esteem in the afterlife confirmation condition
(Study 3). Note: Lower numbers denote less hope.
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Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, mortality salience
reduced personal hope for people low in self-
esteem, but had no effect for people high in self-
esteem, when promises of an afterlife were not
salient. However, Study 3 found that arguments
affirming the existence of an afterlife buffered the
effects of mortality thoughts on personal hope for
people low in self-esteem. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that afterlife beliefs can help to
preserve hope in the context of the awareness of
death, particularly for people low in self-esteem.
These findings are also consistent with the TMT-
based argument that promises of immortality
function as an existential anxiety buffer to protect
people psychologically when they are reminded of
their own mortality. They extend past research
into this area by demonstrating that afterlife belief
can protect psychological adjustment (in this case
hope) when thinking about death (past research
focused on reduced psychological defensiveness;
Dechesne et al., 2003; Heflick & Goldenberg,
2012). Despite the consistency of these results
with past research, and Studies 1 and 2, some
caution is warranted given the small sample size of
Study 3.
STUDY 4
Not all people believe in life after death. Can
science-based promises of immortality—similarly
to religious promises—protect people with low
self-esteem’s personal hope when they are thinking
about death? Using a much larger sample than in
Study 3, in Study 4, we sought to test if secular
promises of literal immortality (via science and
medicine) will function similarly to religious
promises (afterlife belief) in preserving hope
when thinking about death. We provided partici-
pants with mock “scientific” evidence that gene
identification research will lead to a dramatic
increase in life longevity. Similar to Study 3, we
expected that such a promise of (near) immortality
will attenuate the effect of mortality salience on
reduced hope for people with low self-esteem. If
true, this would suggest that such immortality
beliefs buffer the deleterious effects of death
thoughts on psychological well-being, regardless
of if these beliefs are religious (and hence chal-
lenge the notion that religious beliefs are a
stronger means of coping with mortality salience
than secular means; e.g., Heflick & Goldenberg,
2012). To date, however, no research has directly
tested the impact of scientific means of literal




Participants were 200 American users of Amazon
MTurk (97 women and 103 men, Mage = 28.25;
SD = 7.54) who received $0.50 for participating in
a study ostensibly concerned with personality.
Procedure and materials
The materials and procedure were identical to Study
3; however, in Study 4, the Rosenberg’s Self-
Esteem Scale (α = .88; M = 3.75, SD = 0.71) was
followed by a manipulation of life immortality.
Participants in the immortality condition read:
Scientists have highlighted the importance of the
gene let-418/Mi2 in certain non-human animals
because it regulates ageing and stress resistance as
well as being for essential for reproduction. They
have discovered that when the gene is deactivated
in adult animals in the laboratory, they live longer
and are much more resistant to the negative
effects of stress and aging. There is also prelim-
inary evidence that de-activating the gene may
enable the human body to enjoy a significant
increase in life expectancy since it can help ward
off diseases by bolstering the immune system.
In summary, this line of research suggests that it
is soon possible to increase the life expectancy of
humans dramatically.
Participants in the no immortality condi-
tion read:
Scientists have highlighted the importance of the
gene let-418/Mi2 in certain non-human animals
because it regulates ageing and stress resistance as
well as being essential for reproduction. It has
been discovered that when the gene is de-activated
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in these animals in a laboratory that they live
shorter lives and are considerably less resistant to
stress. Scientists have established, however, that
this knowledge cannot be used to impact human
responses to stress or human life expectancy. This
is because it cannot impact the human immune
system, thus having no impact on susceptibility to
illness and aging. In summary, this line of research
suggests that it will be impossible to increase the
life expectancy of humans.
The immortality manipulation was followed by
two questions aimed at evaluating the presented
research. Specifically, we gauged participants’
agreement (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly
agree) with two items that rated the reliability and
importance of the presented research (e.g., “This
research is very important” and “The research
above sounds reliable to me”). These items were
averaged to form a research evaluation scale (α =
.75; M = 4.16, SD = 0.79). This served to test for
different evaluations of the manipulations across
conditions. After this, in the mortality salience
condition, participant responded to either the
same mortality-related items as in Studies 1–3.
In contrast to Studies 1–3, the control condition
asked parallel items about going to the dentist
(e.g., “Briefly describe the emotions that the
thought of a visit to the dentist arouses in you”).
This was followed by the PANAS mood scale;
both positive affect (α = .92; M = 2.70, SD = 0.89)
and negative affect (α = .91; M = 1.50, SD = 0.69)
were reliable. Finally, as in Study 2, participants
completed our General Hope Scale to measure
participants’ levels of hope (α = .93; M = 3.84, SD
= 0.84), followed by standard demographic items.
Results
First, we subjected our “immortality” research
manipulation check to a two-group (immortality
versus no immortality) between-subjects
ANOVA. No significant main effect was found
(p = .22). Participants in the no immortality
condition (M = 4.09, SD = 0.82) evaluated the
scientific “evidence” as equally important and valid
as participants in the immortality condition (M =
4.23, SD = 0.77). Thus, both scientific research
with a high promise of immortality and no
promise of literal immortality were evaluated as
equally important and valid. This suggests that our
manipulations were successful in conveying the
mock scientific “evidence”.
To test the hypothesis that participants with
low self-esteem have lower levels of personal hope
when thoughts of death are salient, but not when
provided with a promise of literal immortality, we
conducted a regression analysis with the main
effects for the mortality salience manipulation
(dummy coded), immortality manipulation
(dummy coded) and self-esteem (mean centred)
entered at Step 1. At Step 2, we entered all
possible two-way interaction terms between the
immortality manipulation, mortality salience
manipulation and self-esteem, and at Step 3, we
entered the three-way interaction between those
variables. In the first step, we once again found a
significant main effect of self-esteem, B = .07, SE
= .01, t(195) = 10.88, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .38,
showing that low self-esteem was associated with
decreased levels of personal hope. In addition, we
found the immortality manipulation to increase
levels of personal hope, B = .24, SE = .10, t(195) =
2.51, p = .013. Consistent with Study 3, the
mortality salience manipulation was not significant
(p = .67). At Step 2, the mortality salience by
immortality manipulation interaction was signific-
ant, B = −.53, SE = .19, t(192) = −2.84, p = .005,
adjusted R2 = .42 (all other interaction effects,
ps > .15). In Step 3, as hypothesised, we found a
significant three-way interaction between mortal-
ity salience, the immortality manipulation and
self-esteem, B = .08, SE = .03, t(191) = 2.88, p =
.004, adjusted R2 = .44.
Given the significant three-way interaction, we
then analysed the effects within the no immortal-
ity condition and within the immortality condition
separately using the same regression approach (but
excluding Step 3). Within the no immortality
condition, there was a significant main effect of
self-esteem at Step 1, B = .07, SE = .01, t(101) =
8.38, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .46. The mortality
salience by self-esteem interaction at Step 2 was
also significant, B = −.04, SE = .02, t(100) =
−2.15, p = .032, adjusted R2 = .49. Predicted
mean comparisons at ±1 SD from the standardised
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self-esteem mean indicated that high self-esteem
individuals had more hope than low self-esteem
individuals within the neutral immortality condi-
tion when thinking about pain (−1 SD), B = .06,
SE = .01, t(100) = 4.87, p < .001, and when
thinking about death (+1 SD), B = .10, SE = .01, t
(100) = 8.44, p < .001, showing that their levels of
personal hope stayed relatively higher across con-
ditions. Importantly, the mortality salience condi-
tion, relative to the control condition, also
decreased personal hope at low levels of self-
esteem (−1 SD), B = .51, SE = .18, t(100) =
2.81, p = .006, but not at high levels of self-esteem
(+1 SD), B = −.04, SE = .17, t(100) = −.21, p =
.83 (see Figure 6).
We proceeded by looking at the effects within
the immortality condition only. At Step 1, again
we found a significant main effect of self-esteem,
B = .06, SE = .01, t(93) = 6.72, p < .001, adjusted
R2 = .34, showing that low self-esteem was
associated with decreased levels of personal hope.
At Step 2, the self-esteem by mortality salience
interaction approached significance, B = −.04, SE
= .02, t(92) = −1.93, p = .057, adjusted R2 = .37.
Predicted mean comparisons at ±1 SD from the
standardised self-esteem mean indicated again that
high self-esteem individuals had more hope than
low self-esteem individuals within the immortality
condition when thinking about pain, B = .08, SE =
.01, t(92) = 6.27, p < .001, and when thinking
about death, B = −.04, SE = .01, t(92) = −3.39,
p = .001. However, the mortality salience condi-
tion, relative to the control condition, increased
personal hope at low levels of self-esteem, B = .55,
SE =0.19, t(92) = 2.96, p = .004, but not at high
levels of self-esteem, B = −.03, SE = .020, t(92) =
−0.16, p = .87 (see Figure 7). Thus, the literal
immortality promise preserved hope for people
with low self-esteem when they were thinking
about death.
Discussion
Study 4 replicated the effect of mortality salience
reducing personal hope for people low, but not
high, in self-esteem that was found in Studies 1–3.
Additionally, it conceptually replicated the effect
of Study 3 (with a larger sample), in that a promise
of literal immortality attenuated this effect. Unlike
Study 3, this was found using a manipulation of
increased belief in immortality via scientific
advances and an American Internet sample instead
of a British student sample. It indicates that
promises of scientific literal immortality can help
people to maintain hope. As such, it provides
initial empirical evidence that secular promises of
literal immortality can protect people from the























Figure 6. State future hope as a function of mortality salience and
trait self-esteem in the no immortality condition only (Study 4).























Figure 7. State future hope as a function of mortality salience
and trait self-esteem in the immortality condition only (Study 4).
Note: Lower numbers denote less hope.
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And, in conjunction with Study 3 and past
research, it suggests that scientific promises of
literal immortality function similarly to religious
promises of literal immortality in helping people
psychologically cope with thoughts of death.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Death signals the potential for all aspects of hope
to be completely obliterated. Drawing on TMT’s
argument that trait self-esteem can function like a
sort of psychological immune system to protect
people from existential concerns, we hypothesised
that mortality salience would lower personal hope
for people low, but not high, in self-esteem. In
addition, we theorised that immortality beliefs,
given their promise (or hope) that mortality is not
the end of all existence, would enable people with
low self-esteem to maintain hope when thinking
about death.
Four studies, using American Internet and
British student samples, demonstrated that people
low, but not high, in self-esteem had less hope
when thinking about death. This was found
assessing cognitive and affective dimensions of
hope, as well as hope for the immediate and
extended future. In addition, Studies 3 and 4
supported our hypothesis that people with low
self-esteem would not experience reduced feelings
of hope in response to mortality salience when
provided with “evidence” of life after death or a
promise of heightened life longevity. Thus, all
people maintained hope when thinking about
death when provided with promises of literal
immortality, but only people high in self-esteem
maintained hope in the absence of these promises.
The results of these experiments uniquely demon-
strate that thoughts of death interact with trait
self-esteem to impact personal hope, that literal
immortality protects psychological well-being (in
this case, hope) when thinking about death and
that secular and religious promises of literal
immortality may be interchangeable when coping
with thoughts of death.
These studies also contribute to the long-
standing debate into how to best operationalise
hope. Snyder (2002) in his influential model of
hope argued that it consists of both agency
thinking (believing you can achieve goals) and
pathways thinking (believing that you can generate
routes to those desired outcomes). In Study 2, we
found a main effect for mortality salience in
lowering “pathways thinking”, in contrast to mor-
tality salience × self-esteem interaction found in
Studies 1–4 for all other measures of hope
(including agency thinking). This distinction
between pathways thinking and hope is echoed
by research (Tong et al., 2010) indicating that
agency, but not pathways, thinking is associated
with people’s self-reports of hope across a wide
range of domains (e.g., towards the future and
retrospective feelings of hope). That people often
maintain hope even when they believe that
external—not internal—factors will lead to per-
sonally desired outcomes (Aspinwall & Leaf,
2002; Bruininks & Malle, 2005) further supports




With hope, there is a sense that one’s life will be
positive in the future, regardless of one’s current or
past situations, making coping with any experi-
ence, including the potentially burdensome aware-
ness of one’s own mortality, manageable. For these
reasons, we contend that in certain conditions
hope may be of greater significance in coping with
mortality concerns than self-esteem, because self-
esteem is limited in ways that hope is not. For
instance, it is feasible that a person dealing with a
life-threatening illness benefits more from receiv-
ing information that there may be a cure (enhan-
cing hope), than from news that colleagues think
his or her work is brilliant (enhancing self-
esteem). To test this direct comparison between
hope and self-esteem in coping with thoughts of
death, future research could assess trait (or state)
levels of hope and self-esteem prior to thoughts of
death and then compare them as potential mod-
erators to a variety of indicators of psychological
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defensiveness and psychological well-being. Such
research could potentially shape the focus of
clinical interventions to aim at improving hope,
self-esteem or both, in response to a wide range of
death-related situations (e.g., disease, grieving,
natural disasters and war) and shape future
theorising into the effects of mortality thoughts,
and a wide range of psychological threats (Proulx,
Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012), on psycholo-
gical well-being.
Although the current studies did not directly
test whether hope can be a more effective means of
coping with thoughts of death than self-esteem,
they do suggest that they are at least distinct in
coping with thoughts of death (consistent with
evidence in other areas of research outside the
domain of death thoughts; e.g., Ciarrochi, Hea-
ven, & Davies, 2007). Specifically, Studies 3 and 4
(the only two studies that tested this directly)
found that people with low self-esteem maintain
hope when thinking about death when literal
immortality is salient, indicating that hope can
exist in the presence of low self-esteem; hope and
self-esteem also correlated only between .07 and
.52 in Studies 1 and 2 within the control
condition. Several studies in our lab have also
failed to find evidence that self-esteem boosts,
after and before standard mortality salience
manipulations, increase feelings of hope for people
low in trait self-esteem (Wisman & Heflick,
2015). Research has also found that thoughts of
death do not reduce explicit self-esteem (and when
covarying fear, it marginally increases it; Lambert
et al., 2014), and that related primes (terrorism
salience) increase implicit self-esteem (Gurari,
Strube, & Hetts, 2009), which is inconsistent
with our results related to hope. For all these
reasons, self-esteem and hope are unique con-
structs showing distinct outcomes when mortality
is salient, making it seem implausible that our
findings occurred because mortality salience exag-
gerated self-views (i.e., the possibility that people
with low self-esteem had less self-esteem under
mortality salience, and this is why we found
reduced hope).
The current findings also highlight the inter-
play between hope and belief in literal immortality,
whether secular or religious. People with lower
levels of trait self-esteem experienced reduced
hope in response to death thoughts, unless they
were primed to believe in life after death or that
their life was going to be significantly elongated
via scientific advances. This suggests that the
prospect of immortality can help to restore hopeful
thoughts and feelings. Further, both hope and
literal immortality beliefs are negatively correlated
with death anxiety (e.g., Harding et al., 2005),
indicating that they both are associated with better
psychological health when thinking about death.
Although our results suggest that hope and
immortality are distinct concepts (people with
high self-esteem had more hope, regardless of
immortality primes in Studies 3–4), future
research could test if both hope and immortality
beliefs are interchangeable specifically in managing
death thoughts.
TMT IMPLICATIONS
The current research is consistent with the TMT
premise that trait self-esteem is a buffer against
the potentially damaging cognitive and emotional
effects of mortality awareness. It extends evidence
that having low trait self-esteem is associated with
reduced psychological well-being in response to
thoughts of mortality (heightened negative affect,
reduced meaning, increased self-escape and
reduced feelings of vitality; Routledge et al.,
2010; Wisman et al., 2014) into the domain of
hope. This shows, in line with TMT, that trait
self-esteem protects people against existential
concerns.
This research also is consistent with the TMT
argument that afterlife beliefs buffer people against
concerns associated with their own mortality (e.g.,
Dechesne et al., 2003). Whereas past research has
demonstrated this in the domains of worldview
defence (Dechesne et al., 2003; Heflick & Gold-
enberg, 2012), the current research directly
demonstrates that afterlife belief protects people’s
psychological well-being when reminded of their
own mortality. It also extends this research by
demonstrating the potential buffering effects of
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afterlife belief in a domain (reduced hope) specific
to people low in self-esteem, suggesting that
promises of literal immortality might be especially
important for these individuals when confronted
with their own mortality. This is presumably
because people with high self-esteem already
have a well-functioning psychological immune
system (e.g., secure worldviews) in place to cope
with mortality thoughts (see Burke et al., 2010, for
a meta-analysis of over a hundred studies demon-
strating the benefit of worldviews and self-esteem
in coping with thoughts of death).
Further, Study 3 is consistent with evidence
(Dechesne et al., 2003; Heflick & Goldenberg,
2012) that mortality concerns are specifically
ameliorated by belief in literal immortality and
not simply by providing an answer to what
happens when we die (as argued by Hohman &
Hogg, 2011). In Study 3, both essays posited an
answer (either we die or there is an afterlife) to
what happens when we die that were rated as
equally valid, but only the afterlife affirming essay
protected feelings and cognition of hope in
response to mortality salience. This is perhaps
not surprising because simply knowing what
happens after death, for instance, by elucidating
the process of organic decay, is likely to be less
hopeful and comforting for most people, than the
promise of an afterlife. Nevertheless, future
research should test these possibilities more
directly as certainty over what happens when we
die was not directly measured in the current
research.
This is not to suggest that religious versions of
literal immortality (afterlife belief) are superior to
secular promises of literal immortality. Indeed, in
Study 4, promises of increased life longevity via
scientific advances also preserved hope when
people with low trait self-esteem were thinking
about their own mortality. Past research has not
directly tested the (causal) role of secular literal
immortality in terror management processes. In
turn, this is the first direct evidence that we know
of suggesting that secular means of literal immor-
tality can function similarly to religious means in
providing “terror management”. As such, it
appears that it is not necessarily a matter of
religious defences or secular defences being super-
ior (e.g., Heflick & Goldenberg, 2012; Rutjens,
van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2013), but rather
the promise that each provides for extending life
(literal immortality) that determines its ameliorat-
ive impact in coping with mortality. We think this
makes sense, as both means directly solve the
immediate problem of death by providing a
solution that promises a longer life, if not to avoid
death at all.
LIMITATIONS
This research is not without limitations. First, we
did not employ a neutral control condition to
compare to mortality salience in any study. This
raises potential concerns about whether the effects
were being caused by mortality salience or the
aversive control conditions (pain salience and
dentist salience). Suggesting this is not the case,
however, across all four studies, the effects were
found within the mortality salience condition.
Further, our effects replicated using two different
aversive control conditions, making it unlikely that
our effects were driven by one specific aversive
control condition.
In Studies 3 and 4, we also did not have a
neutral condition unrelated to literal immortality.
The pattern of results, though, suggests that the
immortality affirmation conditions were driving
the effect of trait self-esteem and mortality
salience on hope, as opposed to the arguments
against literal immortality. The results in the
disconfirming condition mirrored those of Studies
1 and 2 when literal immortality was primed,
where the results in the afterlife affirmation
condition did not. This is consistent with past
research (Dechesne et al., 2003) that found that
arguments against life after death do not exacer-
bate mortality salience effects relative to control
conditions, but that arguments for life after death
reduce these effects.
Additionally, Study 1, and especially Study 3,
could benefit from direct replication using larger
samples. However, the effect of Study 1 is
bolstered by a conceptual replication in Study 2
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with a larger sample, and Study 3 is bolstered by a
conceptual replication in Study 4 using a secular
promise of life longevity using a much larger
sample. Thus, that mortality thoughts reduce
hope for low self-esteem (but not high self-
esteem) across four studies using three measures
of hope, suggesting that this effect is robust.
Last, it is worth noting that we would not
anticipate hope to be preserved for people with
low self-esteem when reminded of death if the
promise of literal immortality was highly aversive
(e.g., belief that one is going to Hell or will
reincarnate as an insect). It is difficult to imagine
that a highly aversive future existence would
provide much belief or feeling that the future will
be full of desired outcomes; there is some evidence
that priming “evidence” of Hell, for instance, does
not reduce the impact of mortality salience on
worldview defence (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009).
Thus, while we do not make this valence distinc-
tion in the article, we do not wish to imply that we
think that all afterlives would preserve hope when
thinking about death. In that vein, it is worth
noting that the secular promise of literal immor-
tality used in Study 4, while not promising
someone a good or bad future, was clearly framed
as a positive advancement.
CONCLUSION
Cicero once wrote that, “while there is hope, there
is life”. If this is true, then when pondering death,
people may feel less alive and less hopeful. The
current studies converge with past research (Rou-
tledge et al., 2010) to indicate that this is the
precise double whammy that people with low self-
esteem experience psychologically when thinking
about their own mortality. Happily though, the
prospect of literal immortality, whether through
afterlives or medical advances, may revive hope for
those who ponder death. Hence, the prospect of
death need not leave people feeling hopelessly
mortal, with or without religion.
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